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TheRole of Savings Bonds in Postwar
Saving and Federal Debt Management
In the pattern of individuals' saving and financial asset holdings, Series
E bonds occupy a position similar to that of savings accounts of private
financial intermediaries. Like savings accounts, E bonds generally
are suitable for investors with limited resources who seek liquid, riskiess
investments. Both E bonds and savings accounts are held by large
numbers of individuals in most income, asset, age, and occupation
groups (Chapter 3). Despite some with respect to invest-
ment characteristics, distribution of holdings, and rates of turnover of
outstanding amounts, E bonds and savings accounts appear to serve
similar financial needs of individuals in similar economic circumstances.
Accordingly, E bonds appear to be more closely competitive with
savings accounts than with any other major type of investment medium
that is widely held by individuals. In a broader sense, savings bonds
are competitive with a wider array of savings media. In recent years,
when interest rates on marketable bonds rose substantially above sav-
ings bond yields, some individuals appeared to switch from E and H
bonds to marketable Treasury obligations. F, G, J, and K bonds, par-
ticularly, appear to have been close alternatives to marketable bonds
in the portfolios of wealthy investors.
In Treasury finances, savings bonds occupy a unique position
(Chapter 2). They represent the bulk of the nonmarketable federal
debt held by private investors, and are the principal means by which
the Treasury has borrowed from individuals in recent decades. Unlike
other types of Treasury securities, E bonds are continuously available
to purchasers and are offeredrates that are held constant for extended
periods of time.
80Just as there are alternatives to savings bonds as investments for
individuals, so are there numerous alternative means of financing federal
expenditures. In a broad sense, savings bond financing, like any other
type of borrowing, may be regarded as an alternative to taxation, at
one extreme, and new money creation, at the other. For the purpose of
this paper, a more relevant comparison may be made between savings
bond financing and other methods of borrowing. As already indicated,
one potential alternative suggested by some observers is the sale to
individuals of marketable bonds or other securities that, unlike savings
bonds, cannot always be liquidated without loss. In short, the Treasury
would change the nature of the securities offered to individuals, but
would still seek to borrow directly from them. Another alternative would
have the Treasury abandon direct borrowing from individuals and
borrow solely from institutional and corporate lenders. Under this
method, the Treasury, in effect, would rely on private intermediaries
to gather up the savings of individuals and would seek to borrow the
funds from the intermediaries. In appraising the role of savings bonds
in debt management, it is helpful to bear these alternatives in mind.
ROLE IN SAVING
The importance of the savings bond program in individuals' saving has
varied greatly during the postwar period. As indicated earlier, net
additions to savings bond holdings accounted for a significant proportion
of the flow of individuals' financial saving during the early postwar
years, although much less than during World War II. The $6.3 billion
increase in nonfarm households' holdings of savings bonds during
1946-50 represented about 8 per cent of gross financial saving and 27
per cent of the total gain in their holdings of savings deposits, shares,
and bonds (Table II). For E bonds alone, the corresponding per-
centages were 4 per cent and 16 per cent.
Except for any influence the program may have had on the total
volume of personal saving (discussed below), the growth of savings
bond holdings stemmed from the diversion to the Treasury of savings
that would otherwise have been accumulated in other media. Although
the incidence of the net inflow of funds into the savings bond program
cannot be determined precisely, it probably was borne partly by private
81financial intermediaries, particularly savings departments of commer-
cial banks, mutual savings banks, and savings and loan associations. To
the extent that the program diverted funds from private noncommercial-
bank financial intermediaries, it tended to reduce the total assets of
these intermediaries relative to what their assets would have been had
the Treasury made no effort to borrow directly from individuals.
Net purchases of savings bonds during this period may also have
diverted funds directly from investment in capital market instruments,
as well as indirectly, by reducing the growth of intermediaries. About
55 per cent of the growth of nonfarm households' savings bond holdings
during this period was due to bonds other than Series E; and, as indi-
cated earlier, investors in F, C, J, and K bonds appear to shift between
savings bonds and marketable securities more readily than holders of
E bonds. In part, the growth of savings bond holdings may have re-
flected merely switches by investors from marketable Treasury securities
to higher-yield sayings bonds.1
Beginning in 1950, annual net additions to savings bond holdings
declined sharplyabsoluteterms and.relative to gross financial savings,
and later were succeeded by net reductions. For the eight-year period
1951-58, savings bond holdings of individuals declined by $2 billion.
Since their holdings of United States government securities other than
savings bonds also declined (Table A-S), it would appear that in the
aggregate funds obtained by investors through net redemptions of
savings bonds flowed largely into private financial intermediaries and
other nonfederal investment media, except to the extent that they were
used to finance consumption or to repay debts. In 1959, individuals
purchased a substantial amount Of rnarketables according to Treasury
data; this suggests that funds obtained through redemption of savings
bonds in that year were used partly to purchase other types of Treasury
securities. In 1960, however, liquidation of savings bonds was again
accompanied by liquidation by individuals of other Treasury securities.
The decline in the growth of savings bond holdings was concen-
trated in bonds of series other than E and H. Net additions to E- and
IAccordingto Treasury estimates, individuals (including partnerships and personal
trust accounts) reduced their holdings of Treasury obligations other than savings
bonds by $4.5 billion during 1946-50, while they increased their holdings of savings
bonds by $6.7 billion. During this period yields on long-term marketable United
States government bonds were below the 2.5 per cent yields to maturity of F and G
bonds and well below the 2.9 per cent rate on E bonds.
82H-bond holdings were actually higher in dollar amount on an average
annual basis during the 1950's than in previous postwar years, but were
substantially lower relative to other forms of savings, representing in
1951-58 only 3 per cent of gross. financial saving and 9 per cent of net
additions to savings deposits, share. accounts, and savings bonds of
nonfarm households (Table 11).
In addition to influencing the allocation ofsaving, the savings bond
program may have had some effect on the total level of saving. No
definite, conclusion ;can be reached on this particular point. It may
perhaps .beargued that savings bond program encourages saving
(raises the propensity. to save) by exerting an upward pressure on-rates
of return paid to savers through competition with other forms of personal
saving, helping to provide variety in savings media, and instilling habits
of thrift. It may be argued, further, that th.e program is a more effective
means of stimulating saving by individuals through Treasury action
than alternative methods of borrowing. Such arguments assume that
changes in interest rates and promotional activity significantly affect
the propensity to save, a view which involves basic theoretical consider-
ations that are- beyond the scope of this paper.
'it is also- sometimes suggested that the program significantly affects
aggregate saving by meaiis, of the. discipline of periodic deductions
from wages for the purchase of. E bonds through the payroll savings
plan. Such periodic wage deductions may induce, some individuals to
save a greater proportion of their incomes than if they attempted merely
to set aside funds "left over" after consumption expenditures.2
Sales of E bonds through the payroll savings plan have been a
prominent feature of the savings, bond-program since- the early years
of World War II; similar methods of saving are not available widely
at private savings institutions. Participation in the plan declined pre-
cipiitously at the end of the war, but rose somewhat in more recent years.
In fiscal 1954, payroll deductions amounted to $160 million a month,
2Resultsof a survey of consumer saving in early 1946 suggest that spending units
that had a definite plan -for systematic savings, such as the payroll savings plan,
tended to save more of their incomes than -other spending units (see- National
Survey of Liquid Asset Holdings,'S pending, and Saving, Part II: Relation of
Saving and Holdings to Income, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, .July-1946,
pp. 34, 35). -This does not necessarily indicate that definite planning and periodic
outlays for savings bonds or other assets do in fact facilitate saving. It may indicate
merely that spending units with high -proPensities to save tend to choose a means
of regular saving or that unith with 'low propensities to save find it
difficult to carry out programs of regular .
83according to Treasury reports.3 They represented one-half of average
monthly sales of E bonds. Here again there is little basis for definite
conclusions. Part of the inflow into the program from payroll deductions
may have reflected additional saving; part presumably reflected the
diversion to the Treasury of funds that would have been saved through
other means. Moreover, postwar sales through the plan may have been
offset in large part by redemptions. Adequate data on sales through
payroll deductions and redemptions of bonds previously sold by this
means are not available. However, as. indicated in Chapter 4, about
one-half of the amount of $25 E bonds sold in each year during the
postwar period, and two-fifths of all $50 E bonds, have been redeemed
within one year after being issued. If the record of small-denomination
E bonds may be assumed to reflect that of the payroll savings plan, it
would appear that a substantial proportion of bonds sold through the
plan have been fairly quickly redeemed.
In considering the effects of the savings bond program on postwar
saving, attention should be focused not only on postwar sales and re-
demption activity, as above, but also on the large holdings of these
bonds left over from World War II. It has been suggested that the large
stock of readily redeemable savings bonds and other liquid assets built
up through federal deficit financing during the war stimulated postwar
consumption. The precise nature of the link between liquid asset hold-
ings and spending has been discussed at length in the lijterattire, but
remains in doubt.4 Various suggestions have been made about how a
major increase in liquid asset holdings of the magnitude experienced
during World War II may affect propensities to save and consume. For
example, increased liquid asset holdings may reduce the need and desire
3AnnualReport, Treasury, 1954, P. 157
4Thelengthy list of references on the effects of changes in wealth on spending
behavior includes Gardner Ackley, "The Wealth-Saving Relationship," Journal
of Political Economy, April 1951; James S. Duesenberry, "The Determinants of
Savings Behavior: A Summary," in.Savings in the Modern Economy, ed. Walter
W: Heller et al. (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1953), and com-
ments by James Morgan and James Tobin in the same volume; Lawrencç R.
Klein, "Estimating Patterns of Saving Behavior from Sample Data," Econometrica,
October 1951; Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), Chap. 22; Don Patinkin, Money Interest
and Prices (Evanston, Roy Peterson and Company, 1956.); James Tobin, "Asset
Holdings and Spending Decisions," .American Economic Review, May 1952, pp.
109-128; and Arnold Zellner "The Short-Run Consumption Function," Econo-
metrica, October 1957, pp. 552-567.
84to accumulate; liquid reserves out of current income' for future emer-
gencies or to meet specific savings goals. A large stock of liquid assets
may facilitate dissaving through asset liquidation and tends to shield
holders from the effects of restrictive monetary policy actions. Much
more complex hypotheses also have been advanced. To the extent that
the existence of large holdings of 'liquid assets stimulates or permits
increased spending relative, to the stock of money,. income velocity5
is stimulated.
Alternative wartime financing programs might have had different
effects on postwar consumer spending. Compared with savings bond
financing, a wartime program of greater taxation of personal income
and less borrowing from individuals would have, resulted in smaller
postwar holdings of liquid assets 'and, presumably, a lower postwar
level of spending relative to income.6 Alternatively, a program designed
to induce or force individuals to acquire marketable bonds or securities
with restricted redeemability also might have resulted in a lower level
of postwar spending than savings bond financing, to the extent that
propensities to consume are directly related to thedegree of "moneyness"
of individuals' financial asset holdings. On the other hand, a policy
of borrowing solely at the institutional, level might have had much
the same effect on postwar consumption and saving as the program
to the extent that funds that were actually used to purchase savings
bonds would have been channeled into' other liquid savings media.
A lack of conclusive empirical evidence on the influence of changes in
the size and composition of financial asset holdings on the behavior
of consumers makes it difficult to appraise •the magnitude of these
differences in impact on consumer spending.
With respect to the effects of savings bond holdings on the ability
of individuals to dissave during the postwar period, it should be noted
that although many savings bond holders presumably did liquidate
savings bonds during the postwar period in order to finance spending
(they may have bought savings bonds in wartime for precisely' that
purpose), E-bond redemptions were, lower, relative 'to outstanding
amounts during the. period after 1946 than during the late stages of
SDefined'as gross 'national product divided by demand deposits adjusted and
-currency'outside banks.
6Greaterwartime taxation of personal income would also have a different effect
on private spending, incentives, and production during the war. Such differences
would have to be taken into account in any meaningful appraisal of the,relative
merits of the savings bond program and alternative war finance measures.,
85World War II. A sharp rise in E-bond redemptions might have been
expected in view of pent-up consumer demands. Redemption rates of
other series also remained fairly low during the early postwar period,
rising in the 1950's principally because of F- and C-bond maturities
and the increased relative attractiveness of alternative investments.
Moreover, while some holders liquidated their bonds, others channeled
new funds into the program, and the aggregate redemption value of
holdings has increased owing to the accrual of interest, a process
equivalent to the automatic investment of interest earned on outstanding
bonds.
On certain occasions, however, net redemptions of savings bonds
were of significant proportions, at least when compared with dissaving
financed by consumer credit. During the transition year 1946 and
during the nine-month period from July 1950 through March 1951,
which encompassed the Korean War buying spree, redemptions
exceeded sales of E bonds by $0.9 billion and $0.5 billion, respectively.7
In both periods, the attending circumstances strongly suggest that
the net outflow was associated largely with• increased consumer ex-
penditures (Chapter 4) •8Netredemptions of E bonds were small
relative to total consumer expenditures of $147 billion in 1946 and
$154.0 billion during the Korean War period, but were more significant
relative to net increases in total consumer credit of $2.7 billion and
$1.7 billion, respectively.9 During both periods, consumer instalment
credit was subject to controls designed to restrain consumer spending.
Dissaving financed by net redemptions of E: bonds,, therefore, was in
conflict with current objectives of monetary policy.
7Dataon E bonds are based on sales and redemptions in terms of sales price,
excluding net accrued interest. If the net change in the outstanding amount of
bonds, including net accrued interest, were used in these comparisons, the dis-
saving figures would be substantially smaller. E bonds decreased by $0.5
billion in 1948 and remained substantially unchanged during the Korean War
period. Total net sales and net changes in holdings were considerably greater for
savings bonds of all series combined than for E bonds in both periods, in part
owing to sales of F and C bonds to institutional investors.
8Netredemptions of savings bonds during 1957 and 1959 seem to reflect mainly
shifts of funds to more attractive investment media rather than consumer dissaving.
9Figuresare based on Department of Commerce and Federal Reserve series. Con-
sumer expenditures during the Korean War period are based on seasonally adjusted
annual rates during the last two quarters of 1950. and first quarter of 1951
converted to a ninth-month total.
86ROLE IN FEDERAL DEBT MANAGEMENT
From the Treasury's standpoint, the use of savings bonds has had both
advantages and disadvantages. In analyzing the role of savings bonds
in federal debt mangement, attention should be focused on the signi-
ficance of their three major distinguishing characteristics—direct sales to
individuals on a mass basis, nonmarketability, and the potential in-
stability of outstanding
As indicated earlier, direct borrowing from individuals, particularly
through the sale of E bonds to small investors, tends to divert to the
Treasury funds that would otherwise flow to private financial inter-
mediaries. The significance of direct borrowing lies partly in the possi-
bility that by this means the Treasury is able, at any given level of
interest rates, to tap a larger share of individuals' savings than it would
if itpermitted intermediaries to gather up the funds from individuals
and borrowed solely at The institutional level. (In addition, direct
borrowing may have some influence on total saving and there may be
social advantages in widespread distribution of Treasury securities
among individuals.) If this has been true during the postwar period,
then direct borrowing through the savings bond program has succeeded
in broadening the marketTreasury obligations. Alternatively, the
Treasury may have been able to borrow outside the cOmmercial bank-
ing system at a somewhat lower cost than if it restricted itself to borrow-
ing from institutions.
These suggestions imply that the demand for Treasury securities
has been more favorable from the Treasury's point of view at the
individual level than at the institutional level. Unfortunately, it is diffi-
cult to appraise demand functions for Treasury obligations of individuals
and institutional investors on the basis of the postwar record, especially
since they have been offered essentially different types of securities.
Nevertheless, it is significant that individuals' holdings of savings bonds
have increased since the end of World War II. While the increase has
been modest, it contrasts sharply with the marked postwar decline in
Treasury' security holdings of major types of institutional investors
(see below).
The divergent behavior of individuals and institutional investors
with respect to holdings of Treasury securities probably reflects basic
87differences in investment preferences. Individuals may regard the
absolute safety of principal inherent in U. S. government obligations
with greater favor than institutions, which can more readily provide
for protection against risk of default through diversification of their
large portfolios, careful selection of individual issues, and investment
in obligations which have government backing, such as federally under-
written mortgageI.
In addition to possible differences in. demand for Treasury securi-
ties, however, differences in the behavior of individuals and institutions
also reflect Treasury policy objectives. During the early postwar period,
the Treasury. offered relatively generous. yields on E bonds to. indi-
viduals, partly because widespread distribution of these bonds was
deemed to have important economic and social advantages and because
of the basic objective of stimulating thrift. Yields on E bOnds, which
were sold solely. to individuals during this period, were substantially
higher than those available to institutional investors on marketable
long-term Treasury bonds, Moreover,, while the Treasury sought to
increase the, E bond debt, it apparently did not seek to maintain insti-
tutional holdings of Treasury securities at the extraordinary levels
reached during World War II. Indeed, institutional holdings were
reduced through debt retirement during the early postwar years.
Thus the willingness of individuals to maintain and increase their
savings bond holdings during the postwar. period, while major types
of institutional investors were reducing their portfolios of Treasury
securities, merely suggests but does not demonstrate that individuals
represented •a more receptive market for Treasury securities than
institutional investors. Moreover, it should not be concluded that each
dollar of funds flowing from individuals into the savings bond. program
represented a dollar of funds that would not have been available for
investment in Treasury securities had it been channeled instead to
private intermediaries. To some extent, funds .divertedfrom inter-
mediaries might have been invested by them partly in Treasury.securi-
ties. if intermediaries had used the additional savings
inflow to acquire obligations of private borrowers, yields on mortgages,
corporate bonds, and other nonfederal inve&tments might have declined
relative to those on Treasury securities. As a result, other investors might
have found Treasury securities more attractive relative to 'alternative
investments. . . . . . .
Directborrowing from individuals has required the adoption of
securities and marketing methods tailored to the requirements of in-
88dividuals. The choice of nonmarketable securities was basic to the
policy of borrowing from individuals on an extensive basis. Since many
individuals, apparently prefer investments shielded from market risk,
savings bonds have been a less expensive means than marketable
securities of achieving the goal of widespread ownership of federal
debt among individual investors.'0 Furthermore, the fact that savings
bonds (as is true of other nonmarketable securities and securities with
restricted ownership provisions, such as bank restricted bonds) cannot
be transferred by original purchasers to other investors has provided
the Treasury with a means of segregating sectors of the market for its
obligations and discriminating among different types of inve&tors, Thus,
in accordance with the basic objectives of the savings bond program,
the Treasury, for a long period of time, offered preferential yields on
E bonds solely to individuals. In general, through the use of nonmarket-
able securities, the Treasury has been able to segregate sectors of the
market for its securities in order to minimize interest costs, reward
particular. types of investors, or foster the achievement of a particular
pattern of ownership. Finally, since holders of nonmarketable securities
have been deprived of the possibility of capital gains besides being
protected against market losses, such securities have not been the object
of speculative interest.
Today, savings bonds represent the principal departure (aside
from special issues sold directly to United States government investment
accounts) from the policy following during most the 1950's of placing
primary reliance on marketable securities in the execution of debt
management policy. Duri.ng the early postwar years, the Treasury
relied heavily on savings bonds and other nonmarketable securities to
attract funds. In addition to savings bonds, $1 billion of Investment
Series A bonds were issued in autumn 1947, nearly $13.6 billion of
Investment Series B bonds in exchange for marketable bonds in April
1951, and an additional small amount of Investment Series B bonds in
a combined cash and exchange offering in May 1952. From that time
10Theimplications of nonmarketability for federal debt management have been
discussed in numerous places. See, for example, Jacob Cohen, "A Theoretical
Framework for Treasury Debt Management," American Review, June 1955, pp.
320-344; Robert V. Roosa, "Integrating Debt and Open Market Operations,"
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic
Association, May 1952, pp. 214-235; Carl S. Shoup, "Les Restrictions a la Négo-
ciabilité de la dette fédérale aux Etats- Unis," Revue de Science et de Legislation
Financière, July-September 1949, pp. 241-260; and Monetary Policy and the
Management of the Public Debt, pp. 129-135.
89through the end of the period covered by this paper, however, no new
nonmarketable investment bonds were issued. Moreover, the sale of
new short-term savings notes, large athouiits of which' had' been issued
during the early years, was suspended in 1954. Finally, the
sale of J and K bonds was terminated in 1957. Nonmarketable savings
bonds probably will continue to play an important role in
ment 'as long as the Treasury seeks to attract savings directly from
the mass of individuals and individuals' basic investment attitudes
remain unchanged. ' '
Whilesavings bonds 'may 'be liquidated at prearranged prices with
little or no notice, they 'have' remained outstanding for fairly lengthy
periods of time. Thus have of' the characteristics of inter-
mediate- or long-&errP debt Nevertheless, owing in part to the redemp-
tion features 'of• savings bonds, the current flow 'of funds IntO the
program has varied considerably. Variations in net also stem from
the practice of making savings bonds continuously available with yields
that remain fixed for extended periods of time: 'In recent periods of
tight money, when rates of return on alternative investments rose
relative to therigid yields of savings redemptions of outstanding
bonds also rose andsales of new bonds declined; In order to discourage
redethptiOns under such conditions, the Treasury was compelled, in
1959, to increase rates of return on outstanding savings bonds as well
as on new issues. Moreover, when net redemptions became sufficiently
large in 1957; the Treasury was forced to step jip its offerings of market-
able 'securities at an inoppOrtune time, when it 'may have wished to
refrain from making new offerings because of rising borrowing costs.
Conceivably, rising net redemptions of savings bonds during periods
of capital market stringency could lead to increases in 'the velocity
monetary circulation. If funds derived from liquidation of savings bonds
were used tO finance expenditures or were channeled to private bor-
rowers and used' by them for this purpose, while new cash borrowing
by 'the Treasury, undertaken to offset the drain; merely
previously idle balances, the existing'money supply would be 'mobilized
for increased spending. The likelihood of this result would be increased
should the Treasury offset the savings, bond drain through increased
short-term borrowing. These actions would be reflected in an increase
in the velocity of turnover and could complicate the task of the monetary
90authorities." Alternatively, should the drain be offset by increased
borrowing from the commercial banking system, and should cash
reserves be made available to the banks, the money supply vrould
increase. .
Whilethe dangers aristhg from net redemptions of savings bonds
during 'periods of tight money require serious consideration, it should
be borne in mind that the dollar amount of net redemptions in recent
years• was fairly modest. Only in the 1957 and 1959 periods of capital
market stringency did net redemptions measured in terms. of sales price
reach significant proportions (see below). In 1959, moreover, the re-
duction in individuals' holdings of savings bonds was accOmpanied by
sharp increase in their holdings of marketable Treasury
gesting that individuals in the aggregate merely substituted one kind
of Treasury security for another, and did not shift funds tO private
obligations.
Savings Bonds and Treasury Borrowing
During the early postwar years, the savings bond program con-
tinued to be an important source of funds, despite the fact that it
attracted a much smaller volume of funds than during World War II.
indeed, the. amount of savings bonds outstanding increased by about
$10 billion during 1946-50, while, by contrast, the tOtal federal debt
declined by $22 billion. Savings bonds provided a larger volume of
funds for the Treasury than any other. type of security available to
investors, with the exception of marketable notes. The Treasury
sold lesser of Investment Series bonds, savings notes, and other
nonmarketãble securities, and reduced the total outstanding
amoiintof marketable bills, certificates, and bonds. In addition to notes,
only special issues, which are sold exclusively to United States govern-
ment investment ácdounts, surpassed. savings bonds as a source of
funds 17)
•Moreover, the savings bond program was the principal means used
by the Treasury to its obligations to investors outside the com-
mercial banking system (Table 18) Each of the first five postwar years
witnessed an increase in the savings bond holdings of private non-
11SeeWarren L. Smith, "On the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy," American
Economic Review, September 1956, p. See Lawrence S.Ritter, "Income
Velocity and Anti-Inflationary Monetary Policy," American Economic Reoiew,
March 1959, pp. 120-129, for an opposing view on the question whether increases
in monetary velocity, during periods of inflation tight money are a hindrance
to effective monetary policy.
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NETCHANGE IN SECUR[TIES OUTSTANDING, BY TYPE
OF SECURITY, 1946-50AND1951-60
(billions of dollars)
Type of Security 1946-50 1951-60













Special issues 13.7 10.8
Interest-bearing guaranteed securities —0.5 . 0.1
Matured debt and noninterest-bearingdebt a 1.0
Total —22.0 33.6
SOURCE: Computed from data in TreasuryBulletin.Guaranteed securities exclude
securities held by the Treasury. Data are in terms of par value except
Series A-F and j savings bonds, which are included at current redemption
value, including net accrued interest.
commercial bank investors, and three of the five years saw reductions on
balance in their holdings of Treasury securities other than savings bonds.
A principal function of the savings bond program during this
period was to provide funds for the retirement of marketable Treasury
securities. The use of the proceeds of savings bond sales to retire
marketable securities was essentially a funding operation. The market-
able securities retired necessarily were short-dated, while a large pro-
portion of the savings bonds sold during the period remained outstand-
ing for several.yeärs. Of the total maturity value of savings bonds sold
during 1946-49, which includes the period of debt retirement, about
three-fourths were outstanding at mid-1950, and one-half was still out-
standing at mid-1956.12 As in other periods, savings bonds were sold
almost entirely to investors other than commercial banks, while a large
proportion of the marketable securities that were retired was held by
the banking system.
12 Computed from data in Annual Report, Treasury, 1958, p. 32, and sales figures
for the 1946-49 period.
92TABLE 18
NETCHANCES IN HoLDINGs OF SAVINGS BONDS AND OTHERU.S.GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES, BY SELECTED NONFEDERAL SECTOR, 1941-60
(billions of dollars)













1946 —19.2 1.6—20.8 1.6—23.7 1.6—7.4 1.3—1.1
1947 —2.5 2.3—4.8 2.3.—7.6 2.3—1.8 2.0—0.7
1948 —4.1 3.0—7.1 3.0—10.7 2.7—4.2 1.6—L8
1949 4.3 1.7 2.6 1.7 4.9 1.8 0.5 1.5—0.6
1950 —0.5 1.3 —.-1.8







1952 7.9 0.3 7.6 0.3 3.1 0.3 1.3 a 0.5
1953 '7.8—0.1 —0.1 4.3—0.1 4.0 0.3—0.8
1954 3.6 0.4 3.2':0.4 2.9 0.4—2.8 0.5—1.9










1959 7.9 11.1—3.2 11.5—3.0 18.5—1.8 7.5
1960 —0.5—1.1 .8—1.1—1.6—1.0•• —&5—0.3—1.4
1941-45 227.8 45.0182.8 45.0141.3 44.4 64.6 40.1 13.4
1946-50 —22.0 10.0 10.0 —40.7 8.7—4.5
1951-60 33.7—10.7 44.4. .21.9'.—9.5 20.4—4.0 4.5
SoujicE: Computed from in Treasury Bulletin. Total includes securities issued or guaran-
teed, by the' U.S; government, except guaranteed securities heldthe Treasury.
Partnerships and personal trust funds are included with individuals. Figures on savings
bonds acquired by nonfédeEai
in1941-45 are based on the assumption that the federal government held no savings
bonds at the end of 1940 'and on estimated' holdings ,of. commercial banks on that
date derived from Annual Report, Treasury, 1940, p. 62. See also note to Table 17.
Nonfederãl investors are investors other than Federal Reserve Banks and U.S. govern-
ment investment
aLessthan $500 million.
To be 'sure, the savings bond program 'provided only a fraction of
the funds, used by' the. Treasury to retire marketable issues. Its contri-
93bution, however, was by no means insubstantial or economically in-
significant. From the end of February 1946, when the federal debt was
at an immediate postwar peak, to the end of the debt retirement period
at mid-1949, the total amount of iflterest-bearing public marketable
securities outstanding was reduced by $44.7 billion, while savings bonds
outstanding increased by $7.6 billion. Measured in terms of the federal
government's cash income and outgo, the largest source of funds for
debt retirement was the $22 billion reduction in the Treasury cash bal-
ances, mainly in War Loan accounts held in commercial banks. The
reduction of these balances represented essentially the repayment of
unneeded funds borrowed earlier, principally during the Victory Loan
drive in late 1945, and, of course, did not reduce the amount of funds
availablespending by the public during the debt retirement period.
A smaller, but economically more significant, source of funds was the
$15.9 billion aggregate surplus of federal tax and other cash receipts
over payments for the period as a whole. Net sales of savings bonds
(excluding net accrued interest) contributed $5.1 billion'3 and, unlike
the reduction in Treasury balances, may have had some effect on
spending, to the extent that they reduced the suppiy of funds to private
borrowers. These three sources yielded a combined total of $42.5billion
for retirement of securities held by the public.
Of the total amount of marketable United States government se-
curities redeemed with funds obtained from all sources, an estimated
39 per cent was held by commercial banks, 32 per cent by the Federal
Reserve System, and 29 per cent by other investors.14 To the extent that
proceeds of net sales of savings bonds contributed funds for the retire-
ment of marketable securities held by the Federal Reserve System,
the operations of the program tended to reduce member bank reserves
and, hence, commercial bank lending power, in a period characterized
for the most part by inflationary pressures. However, cash reserves
drained off as a consequence of retirement of Federal Reserve-held
securities, from the proceeds of net sales of savings bonds or by other
means, were largely restored as a result of open-market purchases under-
taken to support Treasury security prices. Although an estimated
aggregate amount of $14.3 billion of securities held by the Federal
Reserve was retired between the end of February 1946 and mid-1949,
the System portfolio declined by only $3.6 billion, with most of the
13Netaccrued interest on savings bonds is excluded from data on cash transactions
of the federal government, but is included in figures on total borrowings.
14LawrenceS. Ritter, "A Note on the Retirement of Public Debt During Inflation,"
Journal of Finance, March 1951, p. 69.
94decline occurring during the 1948-49 recession. Numerous other factors
besides debt retirement operations and support-purchases by the
Federal Reserve had powerful effects on the reserve positions and
lending power of commercial banks during this period.
As indicated above, a major proportion of the securities retired
was held by commercial banks. The use of funds channeled through
the savings bond program to retire commercial bank holdings tended
to reduce both the Treasury security holdings and deposits of the banks
and to increase their excess reserves. The impact was similar, essentially,
to the effect of sales of securities out of portfolios from commercial
banks to nonbank purchasers, a process which, except when offset by
restrictive monetary policy actions, enables the banks to expand their
loans. However, the reduction in commercial bank holdings of Treasury
securities was in accord with Treasury policy and tended to reduce
the ability of the banks to shift funds from securities to loans in later
periods of strong private credit demand. The role of the program
during this period may be viewed in part as one phase of complex,
large-scale financial operations that resulted in a sharp reduction in
Treasury security holdings of commercial banks.
In 1950, despite net redemptions of E bonds after the outbreak
of the Korean War, net sales of all series combined amounted to $0.8
billion, largely as a resuit of a special offering of F and G bonds to
institutional investors in the last quaiter.
Redemptions exceeded salesin each year during the period
1951-60. The net outflow of funds remained fairly small until 1956-60.
Net redemptions rose sharply in 1957, a period of capital market strin-
gency, when market interest rates reached the highest postwar levels
attained up to that time. The $4.1 billion of net redemptions of savings
bonds in 1957, together with attrition on marketable security exchange
offerings amounting to $8.3 billion,15 exerted a substantial drain on the
cash position of the Treasury. This drain was only partially offset by
$1.2 billion surplus of cash income over outgo; and, as a result, sales
of marketable securities for cash were stepped up substantially.
15Thefigure on attrition represents the amount of matured public marketable
securities other than regular weekly bills turned in for cash, during exchange
offerings. It includes the amount of tax anticipation bills and certificates redeemed
for cash rather than taxes, but excludes two issues of Treasury bills rolled over
into tax anticipation bills. If cash redemptions of tax anticipation issues were
excluded, attrition would total $3.2 billion.
95The increased savings bond drain in 1957 thus came at a time when
the Treasury's cash position was already under pressure and its borrow-
ing costs were relatively high and rising. Except to the apparently
limited extent that investors switched 'from savings bonds to marketable
United States government securities (Chapter 4), the savings bond
drain was among 'the factors that forced it to increase its market offer-
ings at a relatively unfavorable time. To a large extent, the Treasury
sought to meet its borrowing needs through the sale of short-term
securities, with the result that the average maturity of the interest-
bearing marketable debt declined from five years and four months at
mid-1956 to four .years and nine months at 'mid-1957, contrary to the
Treasury's avowed objective of lengthening, the.: debt: The actions of
savings bond holders thus aggravated somewhat the already difficult
problem of managing the federal debt in a period of .tight money.
Net redemptions were also substantial in 1959, and amounted to
$3.4 billion. In this year, however, the effect on the 'Treasury's 'cash
position of net redemptions of savings 'bonds was partly offset in the
aggregate by sales of marketable securities to individuals'. Allotments
to individuals, partnerships,' and personal trust accounts on subscrip-
tions for public 'marketable securities other than regular weekly bills
amounted to $1.9 billion. Moreover, individuals" total' holdings of
marketable securities increased by $7.5 billion, according' to Treasury
estimates, largely reflecting purchases of outstanding securities from
other holders. These purchases presumably included some amount
purchased from temporary 'holders of newly issued securities, and also
reflect exchanges. by individuals of about $0.2 billion of F and C bonds
issued 'in 1948 'for higher-yield marketable notes. Thus in 1959, indi-
viduals in the aggregate exchanged part of 'their savings bond holdings
for higher-yield marketable Treasury. securities. '' '.
SavingsBonds in the Federal' Debt' Structure
Although annual net sales of savings bonds varied sharply during the
postwar period and declined substantially since 1950, the outstanding
amount of these bonds continued to be an important component of
the federal debt. Reflecting the importance of savings bonds in World
War II financing, their relative position had increased sharply during
1941-45, as 11'able 19 'indicates. During the early postwar period,, the
share of' savings' bon'ds in the total federal' debt increased further
because of the continued growth of savings bond holdings and the
retirement of' marketable securities. The relative position of savings
96TABLE 19
SAVINGSBONDS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HOLDINGS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES, BY SELECTED NONFEDERAL SECTOR, END OF YEAR,
1940, 1945, 1950, AND 1960
(dollars in billions)
SAVINGS BONDSAS PERCENTAGE OF










1940 $3.2 6 8 13 26
1945 48.2 17 21 35 87
1950 58.2 23 30 42 75
1960 47.5 16 23 33 68
SouRcE:See notes to Tables 17 and 18.
bonds declined during the 1950's, but remained about as high as at the
end of World War II. At the end of 1960, savings banks represented
16 per cent of the total amount of United States government securities
outstanding, 23 per cent of the amount held by all nonfederal investors,
33 per cent of the holdings of nonbank investors, and 68 per cent of
the amount held by individuals. Throughout the postwar period, savings
bonds accounted for three-fourths to over five-sixths of the total amount
of nonmarketable securities held by the public.
The continued prominence of savings bonds in the postwar federal
debt structure, notwithstanding sharp year-to-year variations in net
sales, is indicated in another way 'in Table 20. This table is based on
NBER estimates of U.S. government security holdings of various types
of investors for the period 1946-58. Over the span of this thirteen-year
period since the end of World War II, savings bond holdings of nonfarm
households, who own the bulk of such bonds, have been• one of the
stable elements in the structure of the federal debt. Indeed, nonfarm
households actually increased their holdings on balance. This increase,
which largely reflected continued net cash purchases of and accrued
97TABLE 20
SOURCE: Data are on in the National Balance Sheet" (MS., NBER).
Total 'and federal government holdingsat par: The hold-
ings of other investors are at book value, except-for Series A-F and,.J
savings bonds, whichincluded at current redemption values,
net accrued interest. The discrepancy 'results from an adjustment for
the difference between par and book values of holdings 'of commercial
and savi.ngs banks.. Personal. trust account institutions are
included with nonfarm households.
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U.S. GOVERNMENT:'SECUBJTIES, BY TYPE OF INVESTOR,
END OF YEAR, 1945, 1950, AND 1958
(billions, of dollars)
Type of Investor , ' V1945 1950 1958








Noncommercial-bank investors 127.4 121.4 110.0
Nonfarm households 51.3 55.2 51.9
Savings bonds 40.0 46.3 43.2
,
V Other 11.3 .8.9 8.7









Private financial institutions 42.7
,
36.2 .30.1
Mutual savings banks 10.7 10.9 7.3
Savings and loan associations 2.4 1.5 3.8
Credit unions 0.2 0.1 0.1
Life insurance 20.6 13.5 7.2
VOtherprivate insurance . 5.2 8.4 9.4
Investment companies V '.0.2 , 0.2 0.5
Other finance V .
58.0
1.6 1.8





State and l6cal . . • 5.0 ' 5.8 '11.7
Government 'insurance and pension funds 24.2 37.3 54.2
Federal. Reserve Banks and Treasury .
monetary funds
' V
' 24.3 20.8 26.4
Rest of world






0.8 Discrepancyinterest on E and H bonds, was in turn mainly responsible for the
slight rise in their total portfolio of Treasury securities;
The demonstrated willingness of households to maintain .their
Treasury security holdingslevels close to and even above the World
War II peak contrasted sharply with the protracted reduction, in the
portfolios of major types of institutional and corporate investors. Total
United States government securities held in the aggregate by all private
investors declined by $41.8 billion during 1946-58. With the exception
of nonfarm households, all types of private investors having at least
$10 billion of Treasury obligations (commercial banks, nonfinancial
corporations, life insurance companies, and mutual savings banks) at
the end of World War II, as well as nonfarm noncorporate business,
credit unions, and "other finance," reduced their holdings during the
period. In addition to the increase in holdings of individuals, Treasury
securities were absorbed by 'the government and rest-of-world sectors
and by a heterogeneous group of private investors, including savings
and loan associations, nonlife insurance, agriculture, and investment
companies.
The continued retention of Treasury securities by nonfarm house-
holds, while other types of investors reduced 'their portfolios markedly,
is even more significant in view of the fact that they did not experience
relatively rapid growth of total financial assets. If total financial assets
of households had, in fact, increased more rapidly during the postwar
period than those of other investors, it might be expected that their
holdings of a major class of assets such as Treasury securities also would
have increased more rapidly. Comparisons of NBER balance sheet data
for nonfarm households and for classes of investors who reduced their
Treasury security holdings revealed a 127 per cent rise in 1946-58 in
nonfarm households' total financial assets (partly reflecting stock value
appreciation). Although this rise was greater than that of nonfarm
noncorporate business, commercial banks, and "other finance," it was
roughly the same as that of mutual savings banks and life insurance
companies, and it was lower than that of nonfinancial corporations and
credit unions.'6
16Onthe basis of preliminary estimates for the period from the end of 1945 to the
end of 1958, credit unions experienced an increase in total financial assets of
about 886 per cent, nonfinancial corporations 147 per cent, life insurance com-
panies 137 per cent, mutual savings banks 124 per cent, nonfarm households
127 per cent, "other finance" 68 per cent, commercial banks 49 per cent, and
nonfarm noncorporate business 30 per cent. (Data are based on "Studies in the
National Balance Sheet," MS., NBER.)
.99As indicated earlier, the contrasting behavior of individuals and
major types of institutional investors appears to reflect differences in
the basic investment preferences of the two groups of investors and
Treasury policy with respect to yields on savings bonds and other
securities.
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